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RESUMEN 
 
La presente investigación trata de contribuir al conocimiento de los operarios y los académicos sobre los 
efectos de los cambios de la tasa de interés de referencia en los retornos del mercado accionario en Corea 
para el período 2000-2007. Así, el estudio aplica la metodología de estudio de eventos con la finalidad de 
observar la reacción de los retornos del Índice de la Bolsa de Valores de Corea (KOSPI) ante las sorpresas 
de los anuncios de la política monetaria consistentes en cambiar o mantener la tasa de interés de 
referencia. El estudio se basa en la hipótesis de los mercados eficientes, indicando que el mercado 
reacciona ante las decisiones inesperadas del Comité de Política Monetaria (MPC). Asimismo, siguiendo los 
estudios de Kuttner (2000), se construye el componente sorpresa utilizando la tasa de interés de mercado. 
La evidencia muestra que en el corto plazo, los retornos del mercado tienen una fuerte relación negativa 
con los cambios inesperados de la tasa de interés de referencia. 
 
Palabras clave: Retornos del mercado accionario, componente sorpresa, tasa de interés de referencia, 
tasa de interés de mercado 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This research attempts to contribute to the practitioner and academic on the effect of target overnight call 
rate changes on stock market returns in Korea in the period 2000 - 2007. Thus, the paper applies event 
studies methodology in order to observe the reaction of Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) 
returns to surprises in monetary policy announcements as regards to changes or maintenance in the target 
overnight call rate. The study is based on the efficient market hypothesis, indicating that the market reacts 
to unexpected decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). Also, following the studies of Kuttner 
(2000), the paper constructs the surprise component by using realized overnight call rate. The evidence 
shows that in the short-run, market returns have strong negative relationship with unexpected changes in 
the target overnight call rate in Korea. 
 
Key words: Stock market returns, Surprise component, Target overnight call rate, Realized overnight call 
rate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the President of the Federal Reserve in the 
United States, Ben Bernanke, announced a cut in 
the short-term interest rate on September 18, 
2007, the investors cheered. Indeed, stock prices 
surged following the announcement, with the Dow 
finishing the day up more than 330 points or 2.5 
percent. The Nasdaq rose 2.7 percent while the 
S&P 500 closed almost 3 percent higher (La Monica 
2007). A similar phenomenon has been observed 
since the times of Alan Greenspan, who became 
famous by the cuts in the Federal Reserve's target 
interest rate in the United States so that after the 
ending of Greenspan's era the measures of his 
successor have also been followed with great 
expectation. After a reduction in 0.5 percent points 
in the target overnight call rates in September 
2007, there were also cuts in October and 
December, given that the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FMOC) meets regularly to decide 
whether to cut, maintain or raise the target call 
rate. However, a few days before the meeting of 
December 11, 2007, Bernanke had declared a 
probability of a new cut in the target of those 
interest rates. Of course, the Federal Reserve cut 
the short-run target call rate, but the market 
responded conversely to the usual reaction given 
that investors considered the FED should have cut 
it more (Neirkik 2007). Those facts suggest that 
expectations play an important role in the market's 
response when the monetary authority announces 
the direction of monetary policy by changing or 
maintaining the target overnight call rate. In other 
words, surprises generate a reaction in the stock 
market while when the monetary announcement is 
predicted in a certain manner before the news date, 
the effects might not be the same. This could be 
explained taking into account the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis that argues stock prices reflect all the 
available information because new information is 
readily incorporated by the market as investors 
constantly revise their expectations on the future 
of the firms (Fama 1991, Malkiel 2003, Shanken 
and Smith 1996, and Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
2005). Given that much of the literature has been 
devoted to study the case of the behavior of the 
U.S. Stock Market in changes in target federal 
funds rates, and considering that the structure of 
the Korean stock exchange differs from that of the 
U.S., the stock market price movements may be 
also different (Kwon, Shin, and Bacon 1997). 
Taking into account this concern of Kwon, Shin, and 
Bacon (1997), even when the Korean stock market 
is growing rapidly, the market capitalization is still 
much smaller than the U.S. market. Hence, the 
Korean stock market may be more subject to 
speculative  activities,  manipulations,  and 
especially government interventions that could 
affect the market efficiency. In this regard, and due 
to the different perceptions investors could have, 
the question may arise: is it possible that the stock 
market in Korea responds to changes in the target 
call rate differently than the U.S. stock market? The 
present research is aimed at contrasting the 
empirical evidence provided until now, in order to 
discover whether and how stock market returns in 
the Korean Stock Market react to unanticipated 
changes in the target overnight call rate. In doing 
so, the methodology of event studies which 
consists of documenting interesting regularities in 
the response of stock prices to investment 
decisions, financing decisions, and changes in 
corporate control has been adopted (Fama 1991). 
In order to estimate the unexpected changes in the 
overnight call rate target, the present investigation 
utilizes Kuttner's (2000) methodological criteria 
consisting in deriving unanticipated changes in 
target overnight call rates from the difference 
between the announced target overnight call rate 
and the realized overnight call rate. Similar criteria 
was used by Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) in their 
event studies investigation when they studied the 
reaction of the U.S. stock market to monetary 
policy decisions given that it represents a natural 
way to differentiate unexpected from expected 
components  of  the  Federal  Reserve's  
announcements (Kuttner 2000). This research is 
limited to study the effects of monetary policy 
decision only when the Bank of Korea (BOK) has 
determined to change or maintain the target 
overnight call rate as an action to achieve the 
inflation target in the economy. The investigation 
considers the short-run effects of those decisions 
since 2000 given that it was in May 1999 when BOK 
shifted its monetary policy regime from money 
targeting to inflation targeting, and there is only 
statistical information since 2000. The long-run 
consequences of changes in target overnight call 
rate have not been considered. 
Theoretical Support: Financial literature, as of 
Mishkin (1995), Thorbecke (1997), Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2003), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), 
Blinder (1992), and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 
(1993), cited by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2004), 
and Sohn and Eom (2006) establish a negative 
relationship between changes in the overnight call 
rate and stock prices. The evidence that will be 
presented in the literature review section will 
explain in depth the difference between expected 
and unexpected components. However, given that 
the market does not always react conversely to the 
direction of the change in the overnight call rate, as 
described before, it is necessary to introduce the 
meaning of Efficient Market Hypothesis and the 
rational expectations. By understanding these key 
concepts, it will be possible to understand why the 
market could react as in the case cited in the 
introductory section when in the U.S. market the 
overnight call rate was shortened and the market 
reacted negatively. First, Fama (1971), notes that 
“… a market in which firms can make production- 
investment decisions and investors can choose 
among the securities that represent ownership of a 
firm's activities under the assumption that security 
prices at any time 'fully' reflect all available 
information … is called 'efficient'.” In other words, 
an efficient market lets investors make appropriate 
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investment decisions in such a way that they pay 
the price that they actually should pay, and the firm 
receives by its stocks the price that actually it 
where 
 
Pt 
 
=  price of the stock at time t 
should be worth (Ross, Westerfield and Jordan 
2006). Thus, new information arrives every day, 
E [ .   t] =  mathematical expectation conditional 
on information available at time 
and the investors reassess the stock prices, that is 
to say based on the new information, the market 
participants revise their expectations regarding the 
future of the firm making the stock prices fluctuate 
(Ross, Westerfield and Jordan 2006). This way, it 
 
D t+ 
trt+ 
t (t), 
=  is the dividend paid at time t + , and 
=  is the stochastic discount factor for 
cash flows that occur at time t + . 
could be said that before new information comes 
up, the investors have an expectation that could be 
defined  as  the  expected  component  of  an 
announcement. This means the part of the 
announcement the market was able to predict. The 
other component of the announcement is the 
unexpected one. It is the part of the announcement 
that the market was not able to predict, and it is the 
one that really affects the stock price. In short, 
according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, when 
the market realizes the significance of the new 
information it incorporates this information readily 
in the stock prices (Shapiro 2006). In the case of 
the present research, when the monetary authority 
announces policy decisions other than expected in 
regard to the overnight call rate, all the unexpected 
information (new information) is going to be 
incorporated in the equity prices. On the other 
hand, the market can interpret the information in 
different  ways,  thus  depending  on  the 
circumstances of the news, it could be taken as 
positive or negative (McQueen and Roley 1993). 
Given  that  in  an  efficient  market  the 
announcements  affect  daily  share  price 
movements (McQueen and Roley 1993), a common 
model that links stock prices to information posits 
that stock prices equal the present discounted 
value of rationally forecasted future dividends. This 
model can be represented as 
The  announcements  affect  daily  stock  price 
movements if the new information revealed affects 
either expectations of future dividends or discounts 
rates or both (McQueen and Roley 1993). The new 
information is represented by the difference in the 
announced value on day t + 1 and the expected 
value as of day t (McQueen and Roley 1993). 
Consequently, the unanticipated component of an 
announcement on day t + 1 does not have 
correlation with information available on day t 
(McQueen and Roley 1993). The information set t, 
includes past announcements of other economic 
variables,  so  announcement  surprises  are 
uncorrelated under rational expectations if they are 
made on different days (McQueen and Roley 1993). 
Combining  daily  stock-price  changes  with 
announcement surprises on different days allows 
us to isolate the effects of individual economic 
variables. Thus, when the Bank of Korea announces 
changes or maintenance of the target call rate, the 
expected component would be represented by t; 
that is the available information in the day t, while 
the unanticipated component is represented by the 
difference between t+1 - t that will affect trt+ . This 
way,  price  movements  are  affected  by  the 
movements in the new information that affects 
interest rates. 
 
  
Pt  E 
 τ1 1t rtτ 
 
Ωt , 
 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This section is devoted to introducing the data and 
methodology to be utilized with the purpose of 
determining whether and how the control of the 
target overnight call rate have affected the stock 
market returns. To do this, it has been considered 
pertinent to start with an overview on the two 
important organizations involved: the Korean 
Stock Exchange (KSE), and the Bank of Korea with 
its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). 
First, the KSE is a subdivision of the Korea 
Exchange (hereinafter KRX) that is the major 
exchange market in Korea (KRX 2008). In order to 
enhance  user  convenience,  the  KRX  has 
consolidated the morning and afternoon sessions 
into a single session on May 22, 2000 (KRX 2007). 
Thus, the KRX operates the regular session and off- 
hours session, and to determine the opening price, 
the quotations are received from 08:00 to 15:00 
(KRX 2007). As shown in Table 1, the off-hours 
session is divided into the pre-hours session from 
7:30 to 8:30, and the after-hours session from 
15:00 to 18:00 (KRX 2007). Trading days are from 
Monday to Friday and the market is closed on the 
following days and weekends (KRX 2007). 
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Table 1. Quotation Receiving Hours and Trading Hours - Korean Exchange 
 
 
Trading Session Quotation Receiving Hours  Trading Hours 
 
 
Regular Session 8:00 ~15:00 9:00 ~15:00 
 
 
Pre-hours Session 7:30 ~8:30 7:30 ~8:30 
 
 
After-hours Session 15:00 ~18:00 15:10 ~18:00 
 
Source: Korea Exchange (KRX). 2007. “Introduction to Securities Trading in Korea Exchange.” Seoul: KRX. 
 
The aforementioned information is particularly important considering that timing is also important when 
applying event studies methodology (Bernanke and Kuttner 2003). If the monetary policy decision were 
announced when the stock market had already closed, the effects on stock returns could be observed later 
and not on the day on which the monetary policy announcement was delayed. The index utilized to assess 
the KSE's market prices is the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI), its base date being as of 
January 4, 1980, with a base index of 100 (KRX 2003). The KOSPI is a market value weighted index, 
composed of all common and preferred stocks listed on the KSE except for bond-type preferred stocks 
(KRX 2003). The index is adjusted to minimize the effects of corporate actions such as capital changes, new 
listings, delisting, mergers and acquisitions, and thereby reflects only price movements resulting from the 
market activities (KRX 2003). Figure 1 shows the behavior of KOSPI during the period of study 2000 - 
2007. 
Figure 1 Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI): 2000 - 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Korea (BOK). 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007. “Korea Composite Price Index.” Seoul: 
BOK. 
Second, the Bank of Korea (BOK) that was established on June 12, 1950 under the Bank of Korea Act is the 
institution responsible for price stability (BOK 2008). The Bank sets an inflation target every year in 
consultation with the government and draws up and publishes an operational plan including it for monetary 
policy (BOK 2008). In order to accomplish the yearly inflation target, since 1999 the BOK has announced 
monthly the target overnight call rate, which can be increased, decreased or maintained without variation 
(BOK 2008). It would be important to distinguish between targets and realized overnight call rate. The first 
one is the minimum set interest rate at which member banks should lend to one another, the second one is 
the actual interest rate at which member banks lend to one another. Unlike the target, the realized 
overnight call rate is registered at daily frequency as a result of the interaction among the depository 
institutions in the market for money. Figure 2 illustrates both interest rates. As can be seen, the target 
works as a benchmark for the overnight call rate. The sources of data are the web pages of KRX to obtain 
the data of KOSPI index, and the web page of BOK for the target call rate and realized call rate. The period 
of study contains 96 episodes of monetary policy decision between 2000 and 2007. Table 2 shows the 
number and nature of those announcements ranged from +0.25% to -0.5% changes. 
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Figure 2 Target Vs. Realized overnight call rate in Korea: 2000 – 2007 
Rodríguez A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BOK 2000-2007. 
 
The sources of data are the web pages of KRX to obtain the data of KOSPI index, and the web page of BOK 
for the target call rate and realized call rate. The period of study contains 96 episodes of monetary policy 
decision between 2000 and 2007. Table 2 shows the number and nature of those announcements ranged 
from +0.25% to -0.5% changes. 
Table 2 Overnight Call Rate Announcements in Korea: 2000 – 2007 
 
Year
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above shows that changes in the overnight call rate target have not been frequent in Korea. Thus, 
of the 96 monetary policy decisions made, 10 of them consist in increasing by +0.25%, 7 
announcements determined a decreasing in -0.25%, 1 decision consisted in a decreasing by -0.5%, 
totalizing just 18 changes in the call rate target. Also, there were 78 cases in which the MPC determined no 
changes in the interest rate target from 2000 to 2007. As Kuttner (2000) argues, the time at which the 
market realizes about the change in monetary policy is very important for event-study analysis given that 
according to this method the market reaction has to be observed when the fact (monetary policy decision) 
happens. This way, according to the timing provided in the BOK web page, it was detected that there were 
three delayed announcements between 2001 and 2003, that is to say in hours when the stock market had 
already closed trading. As Kuttner (2000) suggests, the way of adjusting is considering the monetary 
policy decision as given in the day after announcement. Thus, the adjustments were made as follows: the 
November 8, 2001 monetary policy announcement that was made at 4.11 p.m. was transferred as given on 
November 9, 2001; the February 7, 2002 announcement given at 3.36 p.m. was considered as given on 
February 8, 2002, and the March 6, 2003 monetary policy decision announced 5.46 p.m. was considered as 
given on March 7, 2003. Regarding the methodology, it is pertinent to recall that the previous section 
established the importance of distinguishing between expected and unexpected policy actions that is 
essential for discerning the effects of changes in the target overnight call rate on stock returns. Thus, as the 
purpose of the study is to analyze the effects of overnight call rate on the equity market returns and taking 
into account that asset prices would not respond only when the BOK surprises the stock market, but also to 
investors' revisions in expectations about future policy (which in turn may be driven by news about 
changing economic conditions), unexpected policy actions merely represent independent events which 
allow to discern more clearly the stock market's reaction to monetary policy (Bernanke and Kuttner 2003). 
This way, one convenient market-based way to identify unexpected overnight call rate changes was 
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introduced by Kuttner (2000) when studying the monetary policy surprises and interest rates in the U.S. 
market. According to this study the unexpected change for interest rates can be calculated as the change in 
the realized overnight call rate between the day the policy announcement is given, and the previous day of 
announcement. A similar concept was used by Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) when studying the effects of 
overnight call rate in the stock market returns. 
 
The definition above mentioned can be expressed as follows: 
 
Δi
u
  (Ιd  Ιd1) (1) 
 
Where 
 
i
u
 = unexpected target rate change (surprise), 
Id = realized overnight call rate the day of monetary policy announcement, 
Id-1 = realized overnight call rate the day before the announcement. 
 
The expected component of the rate change is defined as the actual minus the surprise, or 
Where 
 
Δi
e
 = expected target rate change 
 
Δi = target call rate change 
Unlike Thorbecke's event-study approach, in this paper it is crucial to consider the factor surprise or 
unexpected changes in overnight call rate. Also, according to the theory stated in previous studies as of 
Mishkin (1995), Thorbecke (1997), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), among others, stock returns are 
affected by monetary policy decisions; that is to say the behavior of stock market could be explained by the 
announcements of BOK regarding to changing or maintaining the call rate target. Thus, by definition, stock 
market returns could be named the dependent variable, while the changes in interest rate could be named 
the independent variable. On the other hand, to measure the impact of BOK policy on the stock market, the 
market's reaction to announcements of the overnight call rate on the day of the policy decision has to be 
calculated. However, it is necessary to clarify that the market could also react to the lack of change in the 
target, if a change had been anticipated (Bernanke and Kuttner 2003). This assertion is consistent with the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis that establishes prices of traded securities readily incorporate new 
information, that is to say the market reflects investors' expectations as soon as new information is 
available (Fama (1991), Shapiro (2006), and Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2005)) and react to surprises. Thus, 
if the market expected changes in the overnight call rate, and the BOK does not change it, that is the 
surprise to which the stock market reacts. (3)Taking into account that two expected and unexpected 
components have been distinguished as part of the announcement (Ross, Westerfield, and Jordan 2006), 
and following the study of Bernanke and Kuttner (2003), the target call rate change is broken down into the 
expected and surprise components. Thus, the regression that will be used here is 
 
(3) 
Where 
 
KOSPI r =  stock market return, 
α =  intercept, 

e
 

u
 
iet 
Δut 
t 
=  coefficient for expected target rate change, 
=  coefficient for unexpected target rate change, 
=  expected target rate change, 
=  unexpected target rate change, and 
=  error term. 
 
Finally, in order to test if the Korean Stock Market reacts in the same way as asserted by the theory; the 
paper establishes the hypothesis as follows: 
H0: Market prices do not respond to unexpected changes in the target rate. 
Ha: Market prices respond to unexpected changes in the target rate. 
C
IE
N
C
IA
S
 
E
M
P
R
E
S
A
R
IA
L
E
S
 
i1 
72 
 
UCV - Scientia 6(1), 2014. Rodríguez A.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
As established from the beginning, according to the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and in tune with the 
studies of Bernanke and Kuttner (2003), Ehrmann 
and  Fratzscher  (2004),  among  others,  the 
announcements  have  two  components;  the 
expected, whereby the market should not react 
when the MPC announces the monetary policy 
decision, and the unexpected component or 
surprise, to which the market responds. In such a 
sense, in order to offer a first glance of the nature of 
surprises, it is necessary to discern first the 
unexpected component. After applying formula 1 
to decompose the announcement of interest rate in 
surprises and non-surprises, the last ones were 
classified as positive surprises and negative 
surprises. The results are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Positive and Negative Surprises at MPC Announcements: 2000 – 2007 
 
Policy Decision on 
Target Call Rate 
Positive Surprises       Negative Surprises 
No.        Average        No.        Average 
Total 
+ 0.25% 10 0.223% 0 0% 10 
0 28 0.030% 28 -0.041% 56 
- 0.25% 0 0% 7 -0.240% 7 
- 0.50% 0 0% 1 -0.510% 1 
Total 38 36 74 
Source: Data from KRX (2007) and BOK (2007). 
 
As can be observed, there are a total of 74 
announcements of the MPC on overnight call rate 
that imply surprises. It is pertinent to clarify that in 
the beginning, 96 events were recorded, but after 
the procedure mentioned above, summarized in 
Table 3, it was detected that 22 of them were not 
surprises; therefore, the difference between the 
realized overnight call rate on the day of policy 
announcement and the day before it is zero. It 
means that the market would have already 
anticipated the information regarding to the 
decision of the MPC, and this is why there was no 
surprise. Thus, the main analysis of the paper is 
focused on the 74 announcements that are 
surprises. Table 3 shows that of the 74 surprise 
cases, when the MPC announced an overnight call 
rate target increasing in 0.25%, 10 surprises were 
positive, its average being 0.223%; when the MPC 
announced a decrease in 0.25%, there were 7 
negative surprises, their average being -0.24%; 
when the MPC announced no changes in the call 
rate target, there were 28 positive surprises with 
an average of 0.030%, and 28 negative surprises 
whose average was -0.041%. Finally when the MPC 
decided to decrease the call rate target in -0.5% 
the negative surprise was -0.51%. All those 
surprises indicate in averages the percentage 
change of the overnight call rate the market was 
therefore not able to anticipate when the Monetary 
Policy Committee decided to change or maintain 
the target call rate, and those are not the 
anticipated shifts transmitted to the equity market. 
It is also important to clarify the meaning of 
positive and negative surprises. A positive surprise 
indicates that the monetary policy decision has 
increased or decreased less than expected, or has 
not moved whereas the market expected a 
reduction in the overnight call rate target (Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher 2004). Conversely, a negative 
surprise implies that the policy decision has 
decreased or increased the interest rate less than 
expected, or has not moved whereas the market 
expected an increase in the interest rate target. For 
the present research, there were detected in total 
38 positive surprises and 36 negative surprises. 
Once all the details about selection of the 
information to be processed are specified, the first 
step is to calculate the Pearson's correlation 
coefficient in order to investigate if there is linear 
relationship, and how strong it is between the 
dependent variable that is the KOSPI return, and 
the two independent variables specified in the 
model: the expected and unexpected changes in 
interest rate. Thus, the formula to calculate the 
Pearson's correlation is: 
 
 
 
r  
 
Sxy 
Sx .Sy 
 
 
 
1 
n 1 
n 
 (xi  x).(y j  y) 
Sx .Sy 
 
(4) 
 
Where: 
 
Sxy 
Sx .Sy 
r 
 
 
= Is the covariance (X, Y), and 
= Is the product of X anda Y standard deviations 
= Is the correlation coefficient that has to satisfy -1 r 1 
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The correlation matrix (Table 4) shows that there is a negative relationship between KOSPI returns and 
unexpected changes in the overnight call rate target being r = -0.215 with 5% of significance. It 
means that there is strong relationship between those two variables. 
Table 4 Correlation matrix: KOSPI Returns vs. Expected and Unexpected Changes in the 
Overnight Call Rate Target 
 
K
O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPI 
 
 
Source: Data from KRX (2007) and BOK (2007). 
 
In the case of the Pearson's correlation coefficient 
for KOSPI Vs. expected changes in the target 
overnight call rate, the coefficient shows a weak 
degree of association between those two variables 
of -0.040 with a significance of 74%, which means 
the probability to reject the hypothesis that there is 
a  relationship  between  KOSPI  returns  and 
expected changes in interest rates is high. In order 
to determine if the unanticipated changes in 
overnight call rate affect stock market returns, the 
model specified in equation 3 is run twice; the first 
run  includes  only  the  74  events  of  MPC 
announcements which were surprises for the 
market. In event study analysis, it is important to 
specify  the  cases  were  eliminated;  in  this 
investigation, the 22 remaining cases that there 
was not surprises were: April 6, 2000, January 11, 
2001, October 11, 2001, June 5, 2002, September 
12, 2002, January 9, 2003, September 9, 2003, 
October 9, 2003, September 9, 2004, December 9, 
2004, February 15, 2005; April 7, 2002, May 12, 
2005, June 9, 2005, August 11, 2005, November 
10, 2005, January 12, 2006, March 9, 2006, May 
11, 2006, September 7, 2006, November 9, 2006, 
and May 10, 2007. Second, in order to contrast with 
evidence from U.S. market and the Korean itself, a 
second regression is included, considering the 96 
events regarding to changes or no changes in the 
target overnight call rate. The results of the 
regression in Table 5 show that KOSPI returns have 
strong negative relationship with unexpected 
changes in the target overnight call rate. Thus, the 
coefficient uβ= -2.65, indicates that 1 percentage 
point surprise increase in interest rates causes a 
decrease by -2.65 percent on one-day returns. 
Conversely, 1 percentage point surprise decrease 
in interest rate causes an increase by 2.65 percent 
on one-day returns. The t-statistic is significant 
with a level of confidence of 5% (p-value = 0.05). 
The model is accepted with 10 percent of 
confidence (Prob. F-statistic: 0.12). Also, the 
adjusted R
2
 coefficient indicates that 2.7 percent of 
the variation in equity prices on the days that 
monetary  policy  decision  is  announced  is 
associated with monetary policy that could be 
increasing, decreasing or maintaining the call rate 
target in Korea. These findings are consistent with 
the theory regarding to the direction of equity 
prices when changes in interest rate occur, that is to 
say the theory asserts a negative relationship 
between interest rate changes and stock returns 
(Mishkin 1995, and Thorbecke 1997). The results 
are also consistent with the investigations of 
Bernanke  and  Kuttner  (2003),  Ehrman  and 
Fratzcher  (2004)  who  also  found  strong 
relationship  between  unexpected  changes  in 
interest rates and stock prices. Likewise, the result 
is consistent with the study of Sohn and Eom 
(2006)  who  determined  a  strong  negative 
relationship  between  unexpected  changes  in 
interest rate and equity prices by using intraday 
data. 
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Table 5 Response of KOSPI Returns to Overnight Call Rate Changes 
Rodríguez A.  
 
Regressor Intercept   Unexpected Expected 
Coefficient/Tests 
Value 
t-statistic 
p-value 
 
-0.209 
(-1.18) 
0.23 
Component 
-2.65 
(-1.98) 
0.05 
Component 
-2.71 
(-0.76) 
0.44 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.027 
Prob. F-Statistic = 0.12 
Multicollinearity (VIF) 1.049 1.049 
Autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson) = 2.24 
White Heteroskedasticity (Prob- F) = 0.80 
 
Source: Data from BOK(2007), and KRX (2007). 
 
results shown in Table 5 indicate the absence of 
multicollinearity given that the variance inflator 
factor (VIF) is lower than 10 for both components, 
therefore the collinearity between expected and 
unexpected components do not affect the precision 
of the model. In the same way, Durbin-Watson test 
(2.24) indicates the absence of autocorrelation 
while the White test of heteroskedasticity 
(F-statistic: 0.8) indicates that there is a high 
probability  of  accepting  the  existence  of 
homoskedasticity, thus the probability of having 
heteroskedasticity is low. Following the analysis of 
the t-statistic for the estimator eβ (p-value = 0.44) 
is not significant. It means that eβ= 0; therefore 
this finding indicates that expected changes in 
interest rates do not have influence in the stock 
market returns. This result is consistent with the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, which asserts that the 
market does not respond to anticipated information 
given that this has already been incorporated and 
reflected in the equity prices. Having these results, 
it is necessary to declare formally the proof of 
hypothesis as follows, 
the results shown in Table 5, it is noteworthy that 
 
H0: ß
u
 = 0, to satisfy the condition that stock prices do not respond to unexpected 
changes in the overnight call rate 
Ha: ß
u
 ? 0, to satisfy the condition that stock prices respond to unexpected changes in 
the overnight call rate 
 
The coefficient β
u
 is significantly different from zero 
at 5% level. Hence the null hypothesis H0 is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis Ha is 
accepted. Table 6 contains the results of different 
regressions  when  applying  event-studies 
 
 
Ht  α  βΔit  ξ t 
making no distinction between unexpected and 
expected changes; tHrepresents the stock return, 
and ti is the target funds rate. The response to the 
raw target rate changes is negative as expected 
according to the theory, but small and insignificant. 
Column (b) shows the U.S. market response when 
the target call rate change is broken down into the 
expected and surprise components considering the 
full sample (131 observations). Column (c) shows 
the evidence from Korea, when the full sample (96 
events) was used. Column (d) reports the stock 
market response excluding no surprises (74 
events).  The  outputs  evidence  interesting 
differences. For instance, in the case of the U.S. 
stock market, when the CRSP weighted index was 
methodology. As a benchmark, column (a) reports 
the results from a simple regression of the CRSP 
value-weighted return on the raw change in the Fed 
funds rate in U.S. It shows returns on the raw 
change in the overnight call rate target, 
 
 
(5) 
 
regressed against the raw funds rate change, the 
coefficient just shown, the negative relationship 
between changes in interest rate and stock market 
returns, but the t-statistic was not significant, it 
would mean that the β =0. Thus, one could 
conclude that there would not be relationship 
between interest rates and stock market returns. 
Nevertheless, when Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) 
make the distinction of unexpected changes from 
expected changes in the interest rate, they found 
negative strong relationship between stock returns 
and unanticipated changes in interest rates. The 
 
results evidence a strong negative relationship 
between unexpected changes in interest rate and 
equity returns in the U.S. stock market. 
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Table 6 Comparison between the response of equity prices to changes in target 
overnight call rate in U.S. and Korea 
 
U.S. Stock market Korea Stock Exchange 
 
Regressor 
 
Intercept 
t-statistic 
ρ-value 
Raw interest rate change 
t-statistic 
ρ-value 
Expected change 
t-statistic 
ρ-value 
Unexpected change 
t-statistic 
ρ-value 
CRSP 
(a) 
0.23 
(2.58) 
N.A. 
-0.61 
(1.06) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
CRSP 
(b) 
0.12 
(1.35) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
1.04 
(2.17) 
N.A. 
-4.68 
(-3.03) 
N.A. 
Full sample 
(c) 
-0.081 
(-0.52) 
0.59 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
-2.95 
(-0.83) 
0.40 
-2.66 
(-1.99) 
0.049 
Excluding no 
surprises 
(d) 
-0.209 
(-1.18) 
0.23 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
-2.71 
(-0.76) 
0.44 
-2.65 
(-1.98) 
0.051 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.171 0.022 0.027 
 
Source: BOK (2007) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2003). 
 
On the other hand, the results of column (c) and 
(d), referred to the Korean stock market show that, 
as in the U.S. market, distinguishing between 
expected and unexpected component permits 
capturing the real effect of the financial variable. In 
both cases including or excluding no surprises, the 
results are different; nevertheless by examining 
the explanatory power of adjusted R
2
, it can be 
observed that excluding no surprises improves the 
model slightly. Also, by examining the adjusted R
2
, 
it could be seen that, in days of monetary policy 
decisions, 17% of variability of stock prices is 
caused by changes in the Federal funds rate while 
in Korea 2.7% of variation in stock returns is the 
consequence of unexpected changes in interest 
target. The results of this investigation are similar 
to those obtained for Durhan (2002), Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2003), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004) in the sense that when the monetary policy 
decision determines decreasing the short-run 
interest rate it produces an increase in equity 
prices, while when it increases the target the stock 
market in average responds conversely. 
Finally, the results of the study would have two 
important implications. First, an increase in the 
overnight call rate could also raise the riskiness of 
stocks directly, for instance, by raising the interest 
costs or weakening the balance sheets of the firms 
(Bernanke and Kuttner 2003). Second, raising the 
interest reduces the willingness of stock investors 
to take the risk, for example by reducing expected 
income or wealth or increasing the probability of 
unemployment (Bernanke and Kuttner 2003). 
Conversely, lowering interest rates could reduce 
the cost of credit and benefit the cash flows of the 
firms. At the same time, it could encourage 
investors to participate in the stock market 
increasing their expected income. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By using regression analysis, and a sample of 74 
monetary policy announcements that implied 
surprise, the study determined that there is a 
strong negative relationship between unexpected 
changes in the target overnight call rates and stock 
returns in Korea. This finding is consistent with the 
theory  that  establishes  there  is  an  inverse 
relationship between changes in interest rates and 
stock market returns, that is to say, increasing 
interest rates generates a decrease in the stock 
market returns, and decreasing interest rates 
triggers an increase in the stock market returns. 
The results also coincide with similar studies such 
as Bernanke and Kuttner (2003), and Ehrmann and 
Fratzcher (2004) realized in the U.S. by using 
event-studies methodology. The result of this 
paper is also consistent with the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis since the expected changes in target 
overnight call rates do not appear to affect equity 
prices. On the other hand the methodology proved 
to be powerful when distinguishing between 
expected and unexpected components given that 
through the separation of these two components, 
the study was able to discern the real effect of 
unexpected monetary policy decisions. Finally, the 
changes in interest rate could have implications on 
risk premium or in the firm's cash flows and could 
even affect the wealth of stock investors, and their 
willingness to participate in the stock market. 
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